Tautologies, models and theories--can we find "laws" of manufacturing? by Little, John D. C.
HD28
.M414
Jto, ~Jib
- q'l
WORKING PAPER
ALFRED P. SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
TAUTOLOGIES, MODELS AND THEORIES:
CAN WE FIND "LAWS" OF MANUFACTURING?*
John D.C. Little
February 1992 WP#3386-92 MSA
MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139
TAUTOLOGIES, MODELS AND mEORIES:
CAN WE FIND "LAWS" OF MANUFACTURING?*
John D.C. Little
February 1992 WP#3386-92 MSA
*This is a revised version of Little (1992) in Manufacturing Systems: Foundations of
World-Class Practice, J.A. Heim and W.D. Compton, eds. National Academy Press,
Washington, DC.
ABSTRACT
Are there "laws" of manufacturing? If so, what do they look like? If not, what other
forms of knowledge might comprise intellectual foundations for a discipline of manufacturing?
We differentiate among mathematical tautologies, laws, models, and theories, giving examples
of each. Laws closely analogous to those of nineteenth century physics appear to be unlikely
but empirical models offer the prospect of building new understanding of manufacturing, even
if they may lack the precision ~f their classical counterparts. Descriptive models serving
scientific goals tend to differ from prescriptive models for problem-solving. The latter must be
complete enough to solve the practical problem at hand and yet be selective in their detail so as
not to paralyze problem-solving with irrelevant complication. A growing collection of
parsimonious models and theories can form a basis for the design, analysis and control of
complex manufacturing systems.
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Manufacturing systems are man-made artifacts. Is it possible, in these created worlds,
to discover what might be called "laws of manufacturing?" If so, it can be argued, such laws
would help establish intellectual foundations for a discipline of manufacturing. On the other
hand, if such laws cannot be found, what other forms of knowledge will help us design, analyze
and control better manufacturing systems?
It may be useful to distinguish between several types of potential laws: (1) mathematical
tautologies, (2) physical laws and their analogs, (3) empirical models and (4) theories. Then we
can ask whether we are likely to develop further along each line. Moreover, we can look for
related concepts that may be helpful in organizing our knowledge of manufacturing systems.
Tautologies vs Laws
L=AW ("Little's Law") is an example of a mathematical tautology with useful mappings
onto the real world. L=AW relates the average number of items present in a queuing system
to the average waiting time per item. Specifically, suppose we have a queuing system in steady
state and let
L = the average number of items present in the system,
A = the average arrival rate, items per unit time, and
W = the average time spent by an item in the system,
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then, under remarkably general conditions,
L=AW. (1)
This formula turns out to be particularly useful because many methods for analyzing
queuing systems produce either L or W but not both. Expression (1) permits an easy conversion
between these two performance measures. Queues and waiting are ubiquitous in manufacturing:
jobs to be done, inventory in-process, orders, machines down for repair, etc. Therefore, (1)
finds many uses.
L=AW is a mathematical theorem, having no necessary relationship to the world. Given
the appropriate set of mathematical assumptions, L=AW is true. There is no sense going out
on the factory floor and collecting data to test it. If the real world application satisfies the
assumptions, the result will hold.
The basic tautological nature of the proof can be illustrated by drawing a plot of the
number of items in the system versus time as in Fig. 1. The area, A, under the curve represents
the total waiting done by items passing through the system in the time period, T. Since the
average number of items arriving in a time period, T, is AT, we have as the average wait Per
item (at least to first order, with an accuracy that increases as T becomes larger): W = A/AT.
However, the same area, if divided by the time, also represents the average number of items in
the system during the Period: L = A/T. Eliminating A from these two expressions gives (1).
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Thus the two sides of equation (1) are really two views of the same thing and, with appropriate
treatment of end effects and the taking of mathematical limits, become equal. (Notice that we
have argued the existence of the relationship by considering a single sample of the queuing
process. The generality of the formula and its independence from particular probability
distributions arises because the argument holds for each specific evolution of the system.)
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Fig. 1. The two sides of the queuing formula, L = AW, reflect two different
views of the area A under the curve of number of items in the system vs. time.
In the limit L tends to AIT and W to AlAT.
Physical laws are different. For example, the equality of the two sides of Newton's law,
F=ma, cannot be taken for granted. Each must be measured separately and the equivalence
verified experimentally. In fact, it is well known that F=ma is only approximate and breaks
down at velocities approaching the speed of light. Thus physical laws require observation of the
world and induction about the relationships among observable variables.
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Laws vs Empirical Models
Nineteenth century physics produced many "laws of nature": Hooke's law, Ohm's law,
Newton's laws, the laws of thermodynamics, etc. By the mid twentieth century, however, many
of these laws had been found to be only approximate and many new, messy phenomena were
being examined. As a result scientists became more cautious in their terminology and began
speaking of models of phenomena. This continues to be the popular terminology today. Such
is particularly true in the study of complex systems, social science phenomena, and the
management of operations. The word, model, conveys a tentativeness and incompleteness that
is often appropriate. We enter a class of descriptions of the world in which there are fewer
simple formulas, fewer universal constants, and narrower ranges of application than were
achieved in many of the classical "laws of nature. "
Much valuable knowledge, however, can be packaged into empirical models of
phenomena. Their accumulation into organized bodies of learning represents scientific advance
and provides a basis for engineering and managerial practice. Here are a two examples.
If you examine communications between pairs of individuals in R&D groups vs. the
physical distance between them, you find a curve like Fig. 2. (Allen, 1977). Although there is
no strictly prescribed functional form or universal constant here, there is definitely a general
shaPe and an eXPerimentally determined range of parameter values. The regularity of the curves
can be distorted by a variety of special circumstances, such as electronic mail, location of people
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Distance (meters)
Fig. 2. The number of messages per week between pairs of people in an R&D
group falls off rapidly with the distance between them. After Allen (1977).
on different floors, the presence of a coffee machine, etc., but" the basic phenomenon is strong
and its understanding is vital for designing buildings and organizing work teams effectively.
Another example is the experience curve, which is illustrated in Fig. 3. It is well known
that manufacturing costs Per unit tend to decrease with cumulative production. This has been
documented in a variety of cases (see, for example, Hax and Majluf, 1984).
However, the experience curve is a somewhat different kind of a relationship from that of the
communications example because the decreasing cost does not happen automatically. Rather it
is the result of much purposeful activity in managing the manufacturing process. In a certain
sense, this seems a little less satisfying, than, say, Newton's law, which predicts unequivocally
the trajectory of a ball in free flight after it has been struck by a bat. But knowing about the
experience curve, planning for it, and making it happen, form an important part of many firms'
7
strategies.
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Fig. 3. The experience curve shows production cost/unit decreasing with
cumulative units produced. After Hax and Majluf (~984).
Models vs. Theories
In the social sciences one often hears the term model when there is no equation, formula
or other mathematical representation anywhere in sight. Coming from a background in physical
science, I was perplexed when I first encountered this but finally realized that model in these
contexts means theory in its everyday sense. Theory is a quite general ter~ indicating a set of
relationships among constructs. Some theories are mathematical, (for example, relativity
theory), others, qualitative (as Darwin's theory of evolution).
A fine example of knowledge labeled as a theory comes from contemporary psychology.
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Prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) describes how people make decisions under
uncertainty. As a result of many experiments in which people make choices in different
situations with uncertainties, Tversky and Kahneman have produced a descriptive theory of how
people make such decisions. They illustrate it with Fig. 4.
Utility
Loss------~~------ Gain
Fig. 4. Prospect theory describes an individual's utility as increasing in a
concave function with gains and decreasing in a convex function with losses.
After Tversky and Kahneman (1981).
Fig. 4 shows a hypothetical value function for an individual, expressing the person's
utility for the outcome of some decision. The curve displays three interesting characteristics of
people's behavior. First, people tend to make decisions based on potential gains or losses
relative to some reference point. If y~u change the reference point you are likely to change how
they value the possible outcomes of a choice and therefore may affect the choice itself.
For example, if a person has, as a reference point, a belief about the price of a particular
9
product and then finds the item in a store at a lower price, he or she is likely to treat the
difference as a potential gain. Subsequently, if the person buys the product, the purchase is
likely to be considered especially satisfactory, and, in fact, the lower price may have helped
stimulate the transaction. This is why stores that are running sales usually display the original
price prominently. This sets a reference point and makes the discount a net gain for the
customer.
A second characteristic of Fig. 4 is that the slopes for gains and losses are different near
the origin. The steeper slope for losses indicates that most people dislike a loss more than they
like a corresponding gain. This helps explain the current unfortunate tendency toward negative
political advertising. A quantity of negative information suggesting that a candidate might do
something harmful if elected may have more influence on the voters than a similar quantity of
positive information.
As a third property, Fig. 4 indicates that people treat gains and losses differently by
showing a concave curve for gains and a convex one for losses. The concavity for gains says,
for example, that two separate small rewards to an employee are likely to be appreciated more
than a single reward with the same total value. The convexity of losses means that people find
it mentally desirable to combine a number of small losses into a large one, as we do when we
charge by credit card and pay a monthly total bill instead of several individual ones.
Prospect theory is even further away from the well-calibrated formulas of nineteenth
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century physics than the empirical models described previously. Notice that Fig. 4 has no units
on its axes and even the terms utility, gain and loss seem to be a little vague. Such apparent
sloppiness would be quite disconcerting in engineering or physical science. Yet the shape of the
curve serves to summarize a great many experiments and sheds light on a whole variety of
phenomena. Contemporary psychology is making impressive strides in understanding human
behavior, but it often does so more by identifying phenomena and indicating the direction of
effects than by producing calibrated models analogous to physical laws.
Models for Science vs. Models for Problem-Solving
The models, theories, and mathematical relations discussed above are candidates to be
part of the intellectual foundations of a discipline of manufacturing. They are descriptive of
phenomena in a traditional scientific way. But models play other important roles as well.
Models for problem-solving often differ from models for science. The difference lies
in the criteria, both for choosing what to model in the first place and for judging the model when
it is finished. In addition, the process of building the model changes.
Science is concerned with describing the universe with fidelity and parsimony. These
fundamental criteria tend to identify which work survives to be recapitulated in the text books
of the next generation, although scientists care about other attributes as well - they talk about
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elegance, beauty, surprise and delight. Scientists have developed a variety of tests for assessing
fidelity, for example, the notion of trying to falsify a result. This often involves developing
alternative hypotheses and devising critical experiments or observations that will discriminate
among them. There are also predictive tests. And one can try to think up threats to validity and
evaluate their seriousness.
Models for problem-solving have different goals. Most of us in engineering or
management science are trying to help organizations make improvements in the world, or at least
our comer of it. This is certainly true in manufacturing. Having such a goal tends to change
and clarify the model-building process. It is also likely to lead to complicated rather than
parsimonious models because the systems we wish to understand and control are complex.
Complicated models provide us with knowledge but would not be called laws.
A key difference in the problem-solving case is that we presuppose a client or customer.
This might be a manager, an organization, or possibly society as a whole. The model-builder
may be thought of as a consultant, often an internal one, and model-building is imbedded in a
larger organizational process. We- now find different criteria from those used in scientific
model-building. The principal purpose is to improve the client's welfare, not just describe the
system.
Interestingly, I can think of many more how-to-do-it lists for the problem-solving side
of model-building than for purely scientific work. People have devised a variety of paradigms
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to help the model-builder. Examples are: (1) systems analysis (Miser and Quade 1985), (2) the
phases of OR (Churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoff, 1957) and (3), Urban's (1974) "Building
Models for Decision Makers." The last is particularly interesting because it explicitly considers
the consulting process itself.
Recipes like these are frequently useful. They are check lists that help jog people's
thinking into directions that need to be examined, although such paradigms mean most to people
who have already tried to build models for problem-solving. To others, the prescriptions seem
vague. I find, for example, that undergraduate students often see these paradigms initially as
empty talk, but after a summer job trying to solve practical problems, they relate to the ideas
quite easily. A really experienced person is also likely to find them superficial because the main
points have long since been internalized and second order subtleties have become salient.
Models for problem-solving have a surprising requirement that is quite different from
models for science. Problem-solving models should be incomplete. They should include that
which is important to the task at hand and leave out that which is not (Little, 1970). For
decision-making purposes we want to restrict ourselves to the detail needed for the job (but
should be complete in this). Such a requirement for artful imperfection is familiar to all
practicing engineers and management scientists but to almost none of their clients, a situation
that can cause confusion and miscommunication.
The exhortation to be complete on important issues and leave out unimportant ones begs
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the question of how to determine which is which. Anybody who has done analyses in live
contexts, however, knows well the pressure from the client and the critics to include more and
more detail in the model, and the importance of resisting many of these pressures. This is
necessary to prevent a modeling project from becoming too large and unwieldy and to avoid a
downhill slide toward expending more and more resources on activities that are not going to
affect the results. There are tough calls that require side analyses and off-line arguments to
make the necessary design decisions. One of the difficulties in keeping models from becoming
overly complicated is that there are always aspects of the problem that are unimportant but can
be blown out of proportion by word pictures and one-of-a-kind anecdotes. Ironically, clients
often reject models because of a lack of some feature and then go on to make decisions on the
basis of far simpler mental models and heuristics.
We conclude that most models for problem-solving are not candidates to be fundamental
laws but are artful constnlctions which provide the practical payoffs that justify building a
discipline in the first place.
Simple vs. Complex Models
Ideally, potential laws of manufacturing would be simple in statement and general in
applicability. Yet manufacturing systems are usually complex and specific, involving not only
machines and organizations of people, but many and varied information flows and control
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processes. How is this situation to be handled?
Since, as humans, we have finite intellectual capacity or "bounded rationality"
(Simon,1957), we tend to break complex systems down into small, manageable pieces for
analysis, design and control. Once we have decomposed a system into parts, we then have a
desire to resynthesize small entities into big ones and work with the large entities as new units.
Such hierarchical modeling is a useful approach, but not without pitfalls. Forrester (1961) points
out that the parts of the system sometimes interact in unexpected ways and offers system
dynamics as an approach for treating this.
Large scale simulations performed in computer languages designed for the purpose are
now quite common (Pritsker, 1990, Cooper, 1990). We have outstanding computer capabilities
and increasing experience in modeling complex systems. However, care must always be
exercised in order not to lose the main points amid the detail. I would argue for having simple
models both before and after a large scale simulation. Before one begins, it is important to ask
what phenomena are critical to the decision at hand. It can be helpful to build a few-variable
back-of-the-envelop model to represent these phenomena. It is likely that such a model will
make too many simplifying assumptions to be accepted by the client. and so a more detailed
model may be necessary. However, if the results of running a complex model suggest a
particular course of action, it is imperative to know why the model produced those results, i.e.,
what were the key assumptions and parameter values that made things come out as they did.
In essence, we should have a simple model with a few key variables that boils down the essence
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of why the recommendations make sense.
The building of more and more complicated models of systems using the same
methodologies runs into diminishing returns. Managers face dozens of different problems each
day: not just late schedules, low throughput and excess inventories but also issues such as key
people being hired away, roofs that leak, complaining customers, absentee employees, etc. Thus
there is a need for multiple views; a hundred different small models are often desired, not a
single big one.
Modeling myopia
People trained in engineering or management science tend to think top-down, that is, in
terms of goals, objective functions, design variables, models of processes, synthesis of systems
from subsystems and the like, with the intent of using the entities under their control to
maximize system performance. Consider, however, the following quote from a talk by Mr.
Konosuke Matsushita of Matsushita Electric Industrial Company (Stevens, 1989).
"We are going to win and the industrial west is going to lose; there's nothing
much you can do about it because the reasons for your failure are within
yourselves. Your firms are built on the Taylor model; even worse, so are your
heads. With your bosses doing the thinking while the workers wield the
screwdrivers, you're convinced deep down that this is the right way to run a
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business. For you, the essence of management is getting the ideas out of the
heads of the bosses and into the hands of labor. We are beyond the Taylor
model; business, we know, is now so complex and difficult, the survival of firms
so hazardous in an environment increasingly competitive and fraught with danger,
that their continued existence depends on the day-to-day mobilization of every
ounce of intelligence. II
Whether or not Mr. Matsushita's forecast is correct, he forcefully articulates a critical idea - the
need for empowering and enhancing the effectiveness of people at all levels of an organization.
We indulge in modeling myopia if, as system analysts, we believe we can (or should) be
building complete models of our systems and setting all the control variables. Doing so misses
major opportunities for system improvement that are possible by finding new ways to empower
the people on the front lines of the organization by giving them information, training, and tools
with which to improve their own performance.
Also implicit here is the recognition that organizational coordination is something much
more than top-down control. New ideas are evolving in this area, for example, developments
in computer assisted collaborative work and coordination theory (Malone and Crowston, 1991).
As information technology has decreased the cost of communication, there has been a growth
of lateral communication and coordination and a shift from vertically hierarchical organizations
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to more lateral and market-like structures. Lateral coordination is valuable in speeding new
product development, finding process improvements, implementing new ideas and generally
facilitating parallel but interdependent operations in different locations.
But what kind of knowledge is this? And how is it tested and proved valid or not?
Certainly there are testable propositions and empirical models and theories to be created here
and they hold opportunities for building more effective manufacturing systems.
Outlook for laws of manufacturing
What can we anticipate, then, in terms of laws of manufacturing? Are there more laws
like L=}..W? Probably so, in the sense that we should be able to find other simple but fairly
general mathematical rules and relationships that map well onto the world and provide valuable
insights about operations. An example might be the "shortest job first" priority that minimizes
average wait in system across a rather broad class of queuing systems.
I am less optimistic about finding many analogs of physical laws because our systems are
quite complicated and messy. Of course, we use the laws of physics directly in the engineering
of manufacturing systems. And we readily write down material flow equations equating inputs
and outputs in an intuitive application of conservation of matter. But our complex manufacturing
systems do not seem to invite new laws like F = mao In part this may be because manufacturing
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systems are built of subunits that we, as designers, have defined, both in terms of the atomic
entities and the rules of connecting them. We therefore know the underlying relationships
already and take them for granted. This is different from the physical world, which was given
to us as an undeciphered puzzle, and where the game has been to figure out how things work
inside the black box.
Manufacturing systems are characterized by large, interactive complexes of people and
equipment in specific spatial and organizational structures. Because we often know the subunits
already, the special challenge and opportunity is to understand interactions and system effects.
There are certainly patterns and regularities here. It seems likely that researchers will find
useful empirical models of many phenomena in these systems. Such models may not often have
the cleanliness and precision of Newton's laws, but they can generate important knowledge for
designers and managers to use in problem solving.
As we analyze manufacturing systems, building models of them to understand their
behavior and help with their design and operations, we shall be building complex, problem-
solving models, more often than descriptive, scientific models, although we shall use all of the
latter we can in the process. Ideally, however,our analyses will find summary regularities that
might be called principles or theories and hold over reasonably wide ranges of conditions.
These may be in the form of rules of thumb or few-variable models that capture the essence of
some phenomenon. These will represent the creation of new fundamental knowledge.
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Such work is in fact accumulating. An example might be the work of Wein and
Chevalier (1992). In studying job-shop scheduling (assigning due dates, releasing jobs from
backlog, and sequencing jobs at workstations), these researchers report simplifying principles
of scheduling that decrease the amount of work in progress and improve due-date performance.
Their heuristics are motivated by exact solutions of special cases but can be shown by simulation
to be effective in a range of complex systems. Furthermore, the reasons why the principles
work well (which, in this case, are related to system bottlenecks) can be described and
understood qualitatively.
Finally, in analyzing, designing and managing manufacturing systems we need to bring
in organizational and managerial knowledge, integrating this with operational and engineering
content built up from a few laws, many good empirical models and a variety of theories, but
avoiding model myopia. Many issues will arise that offer fruitful research agendas.
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